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Heraclitus seeks to indicate the meaning and power 
active but invisible in the rich spectacle of the sen-
sible world. In his effort of discovery and descrip-
tion he is one with the earlier poets, who sang tales 
of gods and godlike heroes; with the Ionian natural 
philosophers, who proposed a unity encompassing the 
patterns and processes all about them; and with subse-
quent philosophers who envision eternal Ideas and un-
derlying essences. Yet Heraclitus stands apart both 
from the poets and from other philosophers through his 
acceptance, indeed appreciation, of an ever-changing, 
strife-filled experience. The onrush of experience is 
not to be tamed by stories dear to human imagination, 
not to be explained by a material first principle with 
subsequent processes, and not to be constrained within 
universal conceptual schemes. Rather, the events in 
turmoil flowing through our lives need to be freely met 
and examined in themselves if we are to glimpse a mean-
ing and concord hidden there. If we approach ex-
perience preoccupied with our own purposes, we will 
overlook much that is there for us to find. Heraclitus 
admonishes, "Unless you expect the unexpected you will 
not find the unexpected, for it is undiscovered and un-
explored . " 1 
Despite his openness to the variety of the sensible 
world, Heraclitus teaches that there is a unity to be 
glimpsed bounding the ceaseless change, a harmonious 
structure recognizable to human reason, expressible in 
wox'ds, but elusive to human senses: "all things are 
one" (Fr. 50 |118, XXXVI|). 
Further, Heraclitus focuses his attention not only 
upon the sensible world surrounding human beings, the 
flow of rivers, the movements of the heavens, and other 
such events, but upon the place of human beings within 
these events, above all the activity of citizens within 
the walls of their city. In this he praises the excel-
lence of humans of which the bards sing, but on the 
quite different ground of the place of human excellence 
within the cosmic whole. In so relating excellence to 
the city, he is one with the later philosophers; how-
ever, he does not suggest that one should turn away 
from mortal affairs to find the wisdom to deal with 
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them. Order and meaning can be glimpsed in the city 
just as they can be anywhere. For humans, moreover, 
the activity of establishing and preserving a city 
makes possible a life in unison with the divine. 
Heraclitus seeks to enunciate a philosophical in-
sight about the world; in order to express his insight, 
he needs the skill of a poet as well as the vision of a 
philosopher. He must speak of what is invisible so 
that it will be apparent to one who sees, hears, and 
thinks. Like the Delphic oracle, who "neither declares 
nor conceals, but gives a sign" (Fr. 93 |18, XXXIII]), 
Heraclitus uses imagery and paradox to incite others to 
follow the path of his thought indicated to them in the 
reverberating allusions of his words. 
My purpose in this article is to present a unified 
reconstruction of Heraclitus's thought as we know it 
through the fragments. Toward this end I shall grapple 
with the purposeful obscurity of his language which en-
ables him, through metaphor, to draw the reader's at-
tention away from the visible spectacle he describes to 
the invisible which gives it coherence. My plan for 
this article has four parts. I will first present a 
discussion of- the technique of metaphor which 
Heraclitus learned from his bardic predecessors. Alert 
to Heraclitus's use of metaphor, I will then examine 
three crucial images in Heraclitus: (1) physis, the 
mysterious source of all that comes into being and 
disappears, which manifests itself in the ordered whole 
in flux of the kosmos; (2) logos, the human capacity to 
render into words events and structures of experience 
so that the intelligibility of the kosmos can be a com-
mon human project for articulation; and (3) nomos, the 
rule of law in a city through which humans act as a 
source of intelligible order within the city's walls as 
physis acts within the kosmos as a whole. My recon-
struction will be, I trust, of value both for integrat-
ing the key themes of the Heralitean fragments into a 
comprehensive whole and for study of later currents in 
Greek thought. 
I. The Poets 
Heraclitus disclaims the bardic tradition, for the 
poets sing of things they do not know. The stories 
they tell are popular because of their facile signifi-
cance for those who listen, just as the stories parents 
tell small children describe a world that makes sense 
in a nursery. The bardic myths depict the world as the 
work of humanlike gods whose ambitions and motives make 
them but men and women with powers and enjoyments writ-
ten large. Heraclitus was familiar with Xenophanes 
(see Fr. 40 (6, XVIII]), slightly his elder, who ridi-
culed the myths for attending to all experience from a 
human point of view. Xenophanes argues, "But if cattle 
and horses or lions had hands, or were able to draw 
176 
with their hands and do the works that men do, horses 
would draw the forms of the gods like horses and cattle 
like cattle, and they would make their bodies such as 
they each had themselves."1 
It is childish to expect that all of experience is 
like the experience familiar to us. Further, it is 
presumptuous for us to expect to find our goods and 
purposes reflected throughout the world. "To God all 
things are beautiful, good, and right; men, by con-
trast, consider some right and others wrong" (Fr. 102 
(106, LXVIIIJ). If the world has purposes, they need 
not be ours. The poets fail because they do not try to 
say truly how things are. They describe the obvious 
and praise the accepted, heedless of subtle distinc-
tions which comprise the truth. 5 Listening to the 
poets, one is encouraged to comprehend the world wholly 
in terms of oneself and one's desires. But we should 
grow up. "We should not listen like children to their 
parents" (Fr. 74 (135, XIII)). Rather, we should seek 
to be present before experience as it presents itself 
for intelligent inspection to all who can see and 
think: "The waking have one world in common; sleepers 
have each a private world of his own" (Fr. 89 (15, 
VI]). 
Foolish though their myths might be, the bards were 
the first to struggle to express the invisible power 
active within the sensible world. When someone quakes 
with fear, or fights rather than give ground before an 
enemy's onslaught, invisible feeling or strength of 
purpose is as present as the racing pulse or flashing 
sword. The emotion or commitment cannot be described 
as can sensible experiences such as a face or a force-
ful blow. The poets learned to indicate the invisible 
through comparisons, metaphors and similes, with sensi-
ble objects." An example should make clear the poetic 
technique. 
In the Iliad Homer likens the Greeks' steadfastness 
in battle to a rocky cliff withstanding the sea: 
like some towering / huge sea-cliff that lies 
close along the grey salt water / and stands up 
against the screaming winds and their sudden 
directions / and against the waves that grow to 
bigness and burst up against it. / S o the Danaans 
stood steady against the Trojans, nor gave way.* 
The rocky sea-cliff displays the quality of immobility 
which Homer uses to indicate the endurance of the 
Greeks. The richness of Homer's image allows a wealth 
of correlations to develop in the listener's imagina-
tion: the sea-cliff set upon by countless thrashing 
waves and screaming winds, the Greeks assaulted by un-
relenting throngs of battle-crazed Trojans. Reflecting 
upon the scene Homer describes, the listener is drawn 
back to consider more closely the human scene. 
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Although one might too quickly say that the rocks are 
"anthropomorphized" by comparing them to the Greeks, it 
is truly the humans who are "petromorphized," for their 
standing fast in the heat of battle has become palpable 
through the image of the rocks. 6 
Persons come to recognize the invisible forces both 
within themselves and throughout their world by using 
the sensible, world as a sort of mirror in which they 
see the likenesses of feelings, powers, patterns, and 
purposes which cannot be grasped in sensuous immediacy. 
These likenesses provide a representational means for 
sharing their insights with others, so that through 
discussion and common reflection the world beyond sen-
sible experience becomes a determinate part of a common 
human reality. 
Although philosophers such as Heraclitus abandoned 
the mythic and heroic world of which the poets sang, 
they retained the technique of metaphor and simile in 
order to indicate a reality beyond the sensible. 
Heraclitus, thereby, discusses experience and its order 
through reflection upon the bow and lyre, sleep and 
wakefulness, a river, and the volatile all-consuming 
fire. These images are intended to draw our attention 
beyond them to insights about the world which cannot be 
shown sensibly but only alluded to through images for 
thought. 
11. Physis 
For Heraclitus, as for all Greek thinkers, the pri-
mary experience to be faced is the ceaseless coming to 
be and passing away of a wealth of qualities, objects, 
and animals, as well as mortal humans. The wondrous 
display calls forth the question of its origin or 
source. The Milesian natural philosophers had asked 
after the source as a first principle, arche, whose 
transformations shape the sensible history of the 
world. Heraclitus follows these thinkers in acknowl-
edging a source and naming it 'physis'. Derived from 
phyein (to grow, to sprout, to beget), 'physis' names 
the process of coming into the world as babies are born 
or plants sprout from the ground. 'Physis', then, in-
dicates at once (1) the activity of springing forth 
into being, (2) the source from which all that appears 
enters into appearance, and (3) the rich, meaningful 
interlacing of all coming into being.' 
A contrasting view of physis takes it to be the 
material of all things. John Burnet, for example, 
writes," . . the name |physis1 was given to the 
everlasting something of which the world was made. 
That is quite in accordance with the history of the 
word, so far as we can make it out. Its original mean-
ing appears to be the 'stuff' of which anything is 
made, a meaning which easily passes into that of its 
make-up, its general character or constitution."* I 
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hope in the course of this article to offer a number of 
reasons for questioning so limited a definition of 
physis. On the grounds of the Greek language alone, 
however, one can argue that to speak of physis as the 
stuff of the world is far too constraining. Physis is 
a noun denoting an activity, phyein, just as praxis 
denotes the action prassein. Burnet loses the sense of 
activity, of the world as a process, of events as the 
constitution and dissolution of objects and their 
meanings. The Greeks were far too careful in the use 
of their tongue to indicate activity when they meant 
"stuff."* Even the Milesians sought an arche, a begin-
ning element out of which the process of the unfolding 
of the sensible world began. 
As an activity, its source, and the emergent har-
monious order, physis is invisible; we encounter only 
the particular manifestations which have come forth. 
Physis shows itself to us through its appearances, and 
beckons us to acknowledge it as the active source of 
all which comes into being. A hint or a sign of physis 
is all that we are given by the passing display. 
"Physis loves to hide," says Heraclitus (Fr. 123 |17, 
X)). To say more, such as to personify physis, is an 
unwarranted play of imagination--"Let us not make arbi-
trary conjectures about the greatest matters" (Fr. 47 
|5, XI]). To deny physis because it does not show it-
self more directly is to ignore the full significance 
of all that does appear to us. 
Further, physis should not be construed as a separ-
ate, other being, as a substance or hypokeimenon, which 
only takes on accidental sensible qualities or gives 
off appearances as semblances which it is not. The ap-
pearances of physis are instances of physis manifesting 
itself, the many ways by which the one shows its pre-
sence in activity. 
The full manifestation of physis as a world Hera-
clitus terms 'kosmos', again adopting a Milesian word. 
Kosmos is not merely the product of physis such that 
physis stands apart from it. Physis is the active 
source of all that comes into being. The kosmos is the 
realization and manifestation of this activity. Physis 
is inextricably linked to kosmos. Without the kosmos 
physis would not be a source of activity. Further, for 
the kosmos truly to reflect physis, it must be activity 
as well. We should think of the kosmos, then, as 
events and processes, not as a plenum of things. A 
river is not a thing so much as a pathway of flowing 
water. A lyre as an instrument is the possibility of 
making music. To say that something is, for Heracli-
tus, I suggest, is to say that something can happen. 
We can say of the kosmos, then, that it is physis ar-
ticulate in action, but that physis as source is never 
exhausted in its cosmic ordering and display. Nor is 
the kosmos ever given as a whole which is complete, for 
it would then no longer be an activity. 
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It is through attendance to these manifestations 
making up the kosmos that Heraclitus intends to ap-
proach physis in thought. Heraclitus is intent, then, 
on taking up exactly what is offered for thought in and 
through appearance. He writes, "My own method is to 
distinguish each thing according to physis |kata 
physinl and to specify how it behaves; other men, on 
the contrary, are as forgetful and heedless in their 
waking moments of what is going on around and within 
them as they are during sleep" (Fr. 1 |1,I]). 
Accepting each thing for what it is as it comes from 
physis, respecting its place within the cosmic display 
and parade of appearances, we should neither merely use 
it for our own purposes nor rip it from its context so 
as to peer at it in meaningless isolation. 
The objects of appearance, to be sure, do not come 
into being or pass away in isolation. Qualities suc-
ceed one another, as dark the light; objects interact 
so that there is the alteration of each by the other or 
the destruction of one for the endurance of the other. 
Conflict, interplay, destruction, and endurance are ev-
erywhere and ceaseless. At times it is the change or 
strife that is most apparent, while the continuity of 
the opposing moments forms an invisible series culmi-
nating in a coherent, if transitory, whole. The suc-
cession of cold by warmth can, at times, be a sign as 
well as a shift: a sign that now is the time for 
planting. The seemingly permanent, by contrast, car-
ries with it a real and effective change invisible but 
recognized by anyone who reads the signs. Heraclitus 
offers his most famous example, "One cannot step twice 
into the same river, for other |hetera kai hetera) 
waters are continually flowing on." 1 0 The course the 
waters take has a seeming permanence to which we refer 
in naming the river. The one stepping in or wading 
across the river has a personal history, a permanence 
of character and continuity of experience, held togeth-
er by a name as well. The continuity gives a familiar-
ity which is unremarked. Yet the river banks and the 
human body are boundaries, within which there is a 
ceaseless flow of change and conflict which permit the 
apparent, named entities to be seen and recognized. 1 1 
For Heraclitus, then, both change and stability are at 
times apparent qualities of the world in which each 
gives signs hinting that the other is recognizably 
present although unseen. 
The ceaseless and pervasive strife at work in the 
world does not reduce all simply to weary, pointless 
chaos. On the contrary, the discord and the struggle 
for supremacy we see all about us coalesce at times 
into harmonies or unities among the moments of discord 
and tension themselves. This is not a pattern imposed 
from outside on disparate elements, but a concord which 
comes into being precisely because the interacting ele-
ments align themselves through their strife into an ar-
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rancjement with one another. Heraclitus writes, "People 
do not understand how that which is at variance with 
itself agrees with itself. There is a harmony in the 
bending back, as in the case of the bow and the lyre" 
(Fr. 51 (117, LXXVIII)). In both examples, the bow and 
the lyre, the wood is spanned by a string. As the 
string is tightened, the two ends of the wooden frame 
are pulled so that they should bend toward each other. 
At the same time, however, the wooden frame resists the 
force of the string by pulling back so that the frame 
does not bend. The opposing forces withstand each 
other, and the instrument or the weapon lies ready but 
unmoving. The balance of forces constitutes a graceful 
whole offering the possibility of fruitful use. The 
opposition or tension is invisible, but it is most pow-
erful and effective. Although the tension is invisi-
ble, it makes the visible structure meaningful. Hera-
clitus generalizes, "The invisible harmony is stronger 
than the visible" (Fr. 54 (116, LXXXJ). ('Harmony' 
means not only musical attunement, but any kind of pur-
poseful structure or connection.) Heraclitus gives ex-
amples of tensions within instruments of human design, 
and yet many do not comprehend their significance. Is 
it surprising, then, that strife and the resulting bal-
ance in the world at large pass unnoticed by so many? 
It should be remembered that Heraclitus is not of-
fering to detail a universal purpose or systematic or-
der arising from the strife pervading experience. More 
humbly, he argues that harmonies are available within 
the complex experiences coming forth from physis to 
those who seek them. Not all are harmonies consonant 
with human purposes, which in part explains why they 
.are often not noticed by the many caught up in their 
own affairs. An order or structure can be recognized 
and appreciated only if one approaches it from the 
right perspective. Heraclitus suggests, "Sea water is 
at once very pure and very foul; it is drinkable and 
healthful for fishes, but undrinkable and deadly for 
men" (Fr. 61 (101, LXX|). It is easy for humans to 
recognize their advantage alone and thus to remain ig-
norant of real although alien coherence all about them. 
Although Heraclitus articulates no universal structure 
for the kosmos, the manifold of change and struggle has 
a single source and forms a unity in plurality in 
physis. Strife is necessary so that order can arise 
out of it. Points of coherence are culminations of 
processes which, having arisen, will pass away: "the 
many come from one and the one from many" (Fr. 10 (112, 
CXXIV)). What will always remain, however, is the ac-
tivity of forming coherence, physis itself. There is 
no final organization bringing everlasting peace or 
fulfillment. Strife is constant, but, Heraclitus 
urges, there is a power of ordering active throughout 
the kosmos. 
181 
Because individual formations, such as a river, are 
intelligible, Heraclitus infers that the whole kosmos 
is intelligible. He asserts, "Wisdom is one: knowing 
the plan by which to steer all things through all" (Fr. 
41 |120, LIV|). As the source of an intelligible 
kosmos, physis surely deserves to be deemed divine. 
Yet it is a mystery, a power to be acknowledged, but 
not to be treated familiarly: "The one wisdom is alone 
willing and not willing to be called by the name of 
Zeus" (Fr. 32 |119, CXVIII|). The one wisdom (hen to 
sophon] is most accessible to human thought through 
personifying it as a god. Yet such a way of thinking 
should be recognized as problematic. Heraclitus indi-
cates the problem by speaking of wisdom in the neuter 
gender only to ascribe the act of willing to it. Zeus, 
as ruler of the gods and of mortals, is alone the most 
fitting name for this wisdom, but it does not fit. For 
by naming this mysterious, wise physis, one pretends to 
have gained communication, familiarity, and even con-
trol, although this is not possible: The one wisdom, 
physis, is alone; it does not enter personally into 
human affairs as do the mythic gods. 1* Further, physis 
is not an ageney, like a god, separate from the kosmos 
it realizes; it cannot intercede, for it is not a power 
apart. It is the power active throughout and within 
the kosmos. 
Heraclitus does not intend to replace one myth with 
another or to offer idle speculations on the origin of 
the kosmos. In one elegant and enigmatic assertion, 
Heraclitus forecloses such aims: "The kosmos, the same 
for all, no god nor man has made, but it ever was and 
is and will be: fire everlasting, kindled in measures 
and in measures going out" (Fr. 30 (29, XXXVII)). The 
subtlety and controversy of this statement provide an 
inexhaustible subject for reflection and analysis. 
With no pretense at doing more than offering sugges-
tions for reflection on Heraclitus's meaning, I shall 
make the following remarks: 
(1) 'Kosmos' basically refers to any organized 
whole or arrangement, such as civil law, a deployment 
of troops, or a work of art. On this meaning every 
harmony coalescing from opposing forces is a kosmos. 
So, the entirety of these realizations of physis, the 
plurality throughout which there are ceaseless forma-
tions and dissolutions of unity, is also a kosmos, the 
kosmos. 
(2) No principle or god external to physis and its 
kosmos is needed because the kosmos itself as a process 
is eternal--it always was and always will be. The 
power of physis to turn strife into harmony, to make 
opposition fruitful, displays itself in the activities 
which constitute the kosmos. 
(3) Heraclitus's meaning in equating the kosmos and 
fire has caused debate at least since Aristotle took 
Heraclitus to identify fire as the arche or material 
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cause of all else." Should Heraclitus be taken to 
mean literally or metaphorically that all things are 
fire? 
Writers who take Heraclitus literally to mean that 
all things are forms of fire place him with the 
Milesian philosophers. From the few fragments concern-
ing fire these writers have made ingenious reconstruc-
tions of a cosmology based upon fire. 1* Heraclitus is 
influenced by the Milesians to be sure; their view of 
the kosmos as internally intelligible is an essential 
ground for his thought. Heraclitus, however, is not 
concerned with a beginning and its unfolding. He ex-
plicitly denies that the fire of the kosmos is an arche 
by calling the kosmos eternal—without beginning. Fur-
ther, while there are fragments suggesting a kosmos 
based on fire, there are others suggesting disdain for 
the wide-ranging emiprical investigations of the 
Milesians" and others (mockingly?) asserting pre-
scientific views." Given such difficulties it is pru-
dent to suspect that Heraclitus's claim that the kosmos 
is fire is as purposefully perplexing as so many others 
of his statements. He uses sensible imagery to direct 
attention to what is not sensible: It is likely, then, 
that fire should be considered metaphorically. 
(4) Matter in general can be ordered in a continuum 
with respect to density: solid, liquid, gas or vapor. 
Fire does not fit into this continuum, for it is not a 
thing. Fire is darting, crackling, consuming activity. 
Moreover, fire is an activity which (a) shows itself to 
us by its own light; (b) works both constructively and 
destructively; and (c) makes other things and events, 
which do not show themselves, visible to us. These 
qualities of fire make it the most concentrated and 
comprehensive image available to Heraclitus for incit-
ing reflection upon physis and the kosmos. As with his 
other metaphors, so with fire: We must seek the in-
sight about the world which Heraclitus is pointing out 
to us through his image. 
(a) Fire, as noted above, is an activity which 
shows itself to us. Whatever else fire does, it gives 
off light, making it visible. In order to do this, 
fire consumes and exhausts materials, transforming them 
to maintain and enhance itself. One cannot separate 
fire from the flame or glow which marks its presence. 
No more can one speak of physis without its kosmos. 
Physis is a self-generating activity which shows itself 
through the kosmos it brings forth and directs accord-
ing to its own designs. For the kosmos is not simply a 
show of power, but of intelligence bringing disparate 
elements together in coherence and of organization lost 
to dispersion so that new order might come forth. 
(b) Fire is a medium both for construction and for 
destruction. Through fire some things can be changed 
into other things; fire, for example, enables us to 
cook foods and to alloy metals. To work construc-
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tively, fire needs fuel, which it changes to ash and 
smoke, as it transforms raw materials into goods. 
Heraclitus likens fire to gold: some things (fuel) can 
be exchanged for it (fire), and it can be exchanged for 
other things (goods). 1 7 Constructively, fire is the 
power of coordinating disparate materials into a pro-
cess which culminates in one desired product. Analo-
gously, the processes of the kosmos bring a plurality 
together in strife to form a harmonious whole. Fire as 
a power of change can also destroy structured wholes. 
Houses can be burned down and food reduced to charred 
cinders. As fire flares up and abates, so significant 
structures come together, show themselves, and dis-
appear. All things, we might say, are metaphorically 
combustible: They can be combined in such a way that 
they give off a flash of coherence. These flashes en-
sure an undying fire, for they burst forth again and 
again throughout the k_osmos, even though particular 
flames are extinguished. Throughout the kosmos, sim-
ilarly, the process of organization always accompanies 
that of dissolution: Harmonious wholes dissipate while 
new ones arise. 
(c) Not only does fire show itself to us by means 
of the light it gives off, fire enables us to see and 
to study other things and events-which do not show 
themselves by their own light. As we concentrate upon 
the objects of study, we tend not to notice, but to 
take for granted, the light we use. Similarly, we 
recognize and appreciate particular harmonies within 
the kosmos without noticing the power of physis effec-
tive within them and pervasive of the activities 
throughout the kosmos. The light is there nonetheless, 
as is the power of physis. Heraclitus hopes to cure us 
of our inattendance. 
As fire gives the light to see coherent structures 
within the kosmos, so our attention ignites a meta-
phorical light of comprehension in our minds. When we 
follow Heraclitus's example and seek to recognize the 
activities of the kosmos itself and to comprehend its 
particular structures, that which we study is reflected 
in our minds as truth. When we are overwhelmed by our 
private desires and interests, the light of intelli-
gence is extinguished; we wander blindly like drunk-
ards, stumbling about under the influence of inchoate 
passion. ,' 
(5) Having indicated the metaphorical force of fire 
in Heraclitus's thought, the question arises again 
whether identifying the kosmos with fire has a signifi-
cance beyond the metaphorical. Taking fire to be a 
self-manifesting activity, fire is poorly suited for 
use as a material principle. Prof. Charles H. Kahn 
writes, "But [fire) is a most unlikely choice for a 
starting point in a literal account of the development 
of the world in material terms, since it is not itself 
a kind of matter, not a body at all, but a process of 
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transition from one state to another, a symbol of life 
and death at once, the very element of paradox." 1 9 To 
separate fire off as the active force in the kosmos is 
problematic: The kosmos is itself activity, not matter 
formed and arrayed by an external power or by some fav-
ored part. Also, if fire were literally the arche and 
source of order, how could it be extinguished, as it so 
frequently is? 
To say that the kosmos is everliving fire, I pro-
pose, is to use synechdoche: the most illustrative, 
provocative part of the kosmos is made to stand for the 
whole. For Heraclitus fire is of metaphorical impor-
tance because through it we grasp truths about the 
world which are not sensibly available. Fire differs 
from other images—the river, the salt sea, and the 
lyre--in its fecundity for reflection. It draws us to 
think of the activity of physis and its kosmos in a 
splendidly concise way. Fire's power as a metaphor is 
such that it alone does the work of many other images 
together. 
Heraclitus's interest is not directed primarily at 
sensible experience; he intends to make a statement 
about the world as such, a statement rooted in but 
transcending sensible experience. Although he hasn't 
the word, Heraclitus uses fire metaphorically in order 
to speak with metaphysical significance. We can say 
that Heraclitus tries to move from the world as it ap-
pears to humans, kat' anthropon, to the world as it 
really is with respect to its origin and intelligibil-
ity, kata physin. Yet the perplexity of his images, 
fire above all, stands witness to the impossibility of 
achieving a knowledge of reality as it is kata physin. 
Although later philosophers will seek such knowledge of 
what is as it really is, Heraclitus presumes far less. 
He claims only to recognize the mysterious oneness of 
all in harmony and strife. Physis is no more to be en-
closed by human thought than fire is to be grasped by 
human hands. We should attend to physis in its 
manifestations while respecting its ineluctable mystery 
for us. We always approach the world as it is for 
humans; but as humans we can acknowledge, respect, 
though never master physis. 2 0 
III. Logos 
Physis, as the source of the variety and the intel-
ligibility of all experience, is a mystery to be 
acknowledged. Awesome and remote, yet present in every 
instance of struggle and order, physis truly deserves 
the name 'divine'. The many, it is true, do not appre-
hend this source of order. They grasp only what is of 
peculiar interest to themselves. Their opinions and 
descriptions of their world express a private, self-
centered acumen |idia phronesis] (Fr. 2 [2, III]). 
Drawing together only portions and aspects of experi-
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ence surrounding them, the self-interested make mere 
opinions for themselves as incomprehensible to others 
as a dream. Heraclitus writes, "Most men do not think 
things in the way they encounter them, nor do they 
recognize what they experience, but believe things to 
be as they seem to be to themselves | eoutoi si.n de 
dokeousin"I (Fr. 17 |57, IV)). Their view is not of 
the objects themselves, but only of the objects with 
respect to themselves. They do not truly attend to the 
appearance of the object, but only to a partial view, 
rooted in self-interest, which might have no support in 
the object as it appears itself. 
It should be noted that the being of the object and 
its appearance are one for Heraclitus, whereas a dis-
tinction exists between the object as it truly is (and 
appears) and as it seems to me |dokei mqiJ. This 
distinction foreshadows that of Parmenides, for whom 
there is a Way of Opinion (doxa) founded upon sensible 
experience and the Way of Truth guided by reason. The 
former inevitably leads to confusion because it 
concerns the changeable world of Becoming; the latter 
gives truth because it leads toward timeless Being. 
Heraclitus differs from Parmenides in that he finds 
fault with human responses to sensible experience, not 
with experience itself. 1 1 The manifestations of p_hy_sis 
are adequate for a knowledge of the kosmos. Confusion 
and semblance are distortions humans bring upon them-
selves by failing to attend to what is present before 
them. 2 2 Humans are not bound to the ignorance of fool-
ish tales and to the chaos of a world confusedly per-
ceived by one distracted. For they can concentrate not 
only upon themselves but upon the appearance of things 
and upon the invisible structures active within the 
complex of appearances. 
Physis itself fashions an order which brings to-
gether the volatile, opposing moments of experience as 
the kosmos available for human comprehension. When 
humans attend to the concord which physis itself hides 
within the apparent discord of experience, they gather 
together their scattered experiences in keeping with 
the unity they recognize to be there. Humans can ren-
der an account of this unity, a logos, for one another. 
Logos, a most subtle and rich word, means word or 
speech, and, hence, a narrative or an account. As a 
display of words providing an intelligent explanation 
or reason regarding some event, logos comes to mean 
reason or the power of rational thought and comprehen-
sion. For Heraclitus physis acts within its kosmos 
with an inherent intelligence. Humans are capable of 
grasping and possessing the cosmic order through the 
power of logos; A structure linking events in ex-
perience, once recognized, can be presented in words; 
cosmic intelligibility is thereby reflected in human 
reason. As expression and representation, the logos is 
inherently communicative. The logos brings humans 
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together in a shared comprehension of the intelligibil-
ity of physis. 
True communication with another requires that the 
speaker so present his experience and its meaning that 
the listener is drawn to notice the same (or similar) 
events and connections and to organize them toward an 
agreement with the speaker. Sharing the logos achieved 
by intelligent inspection, human witnesses to physis 
hold in common (xynoi) the findings of their senses 
sought with intelligence (xyn nqi). The logos, which 
they articulate and share, is not their own creation; 
it is the expression of the structured unity which 
physis itself presents as the invisible harmony con-
necting all coming forth into being. Because the logos 
expresses a harmony within the kosmos itself, the 
agreement of all who remark it is the criterion of the 
truth of their discourse. The truth does not vary from 
speaker to speaker; it is the same for all. When one 
speaks the truth, then, one speaks for all and to all. 
Heraclitus admonishes, "Listening not to me but to the 
Logos, it is wise to agree (homolegein| that all things 
are one" (Fr. 50 |118, XXXVI])". Intelligibility, that 
is, is present in the kosmos, available for articula-
tion as a logos. The human logos, then, binds humans 
together as communicative beings, and it binds them to 
the mysterious, divine physis, the source of the intel-
ligibility expressed in the logos, as in all else. 
IV. Nomos 
Heraclitus is philosophically concerned not only to 
account for the intelligibility of the kosmos to human 
•beings, but also to make human beings intelligible 
within the kosmos. That is, the logos particular to 
human beings should be articulated. Humans are, above 
all else, animals possessing logos. Logos enables 
humans to deliberate on the kosmos and their situation 
within it; to persuade others of the truth in their 
comprehension of things; and to take prudent action in 
accordance with their thoughtful arguments. The capa-
city of logos, then, gives a twofold power: thought 
and thoughtful action. (If one takes the kosmos to be 
activity, as I proposed above, then humans should ulti-
mately be intelligible in terms of the actions proper 
for them.) 
Human beings can prosper only by acting together; 
this they can do because through their logos they can 
persuade others to join them in deliberate and con-
certed action. Although in human association conflicts 
and discord ever threaten to turn one against another 
in violence and hubris or arrogant self-assertion, a 
community can be preserved and its members offered a 
full life only through agreements: a body of law 
(nomqs) establishing an intelligible order within the 
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association by giving directions for action and limita-
tions for the constraint of privete interests. 
For the Greeks all human activity beyond fundamen-
tal subsistance takes place within a city. Only in a 
city can people act together, with sufficient numbers 
and versatility, to live a good life in which they are 
challenged always to excel. According to traditional 
beliefs, excellence before others alone can give one 
hope for immortality. Humans are set off from all else 
as mortals. The gods live forever; animals are immor-
tal in their species; but humans live as individuals, 
and so they can die away into futile oblivion. Only 
through the fame of noble words and deeds, remembered 
in stories or songs, can individuals be kept from 
disappearing. 1 1 Heraclitus overturns this view of 
human mortality: Not only humans, but all things are 
mortal — save the directive intelligence of physis and 
the activity of the kosmos. All comes forth into being 
only to suffer change and disappear: "Immortals are 
mortal, mortals immortal, living the other's death, 
dead in the other's life" (Fr. 62 (66, XCII)). 
It is little comfort that all things, not only hu-
mans, are destined to pass away. Nevertheless, Hera-
clitus does not affirm or universalize the futility of 
mortals' words and deeds. For Heraclitus the signifi-
cance of anything does not depend upon its permanence 
or impermanence, but upon its activity within the 
kosmos. For it is activity, not existence as such, 
which is crucial in Heraclitus's understanding of the 
harmony in strife of the kosmos. The activities proper 
to humans--thought and prudent action--link them with 
the intelligence of physis and give them an unique and 
estimable place within the kosmos. 
Within a city humans create an intelligible order, 
a common good, which transcends their private interests 
and their own brief lifetimes. Heraclitus echoes the 
Greek respect for public life, "The best of men choose 
one thing in preference to all else, immortal glory in 
preference to mortal goods; whereas the masses simply 
glut themselves like cattle" (Fr. 29 [85, XCVII|). 
These are the best of men for throvigh them intelligence 
shines in human affairs and a fruitful harmony of in-
tention and deed overcomes the rancor and short-
sightedness of self-interest. 
Within a city thought and argument can mature, and 
opportunity for public excellence on behalf of the city 
abounds. The best live not simply for wealth and plea-
sure, but for excellence in word and deed by which they 
direct and protect their city. Among themselves, the 
citizens decide cases by means of laws rooted in their 
common wisdom concerning actions and ends proper for 
their city. Insofar as these laws are products of wis-
dom, they express the truth achieved by the citizens in 
argument. The laws are the common view, purified of 
private interest, asserted by all as one. Heraclitus 
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states, "It is law to obey the counsel of one" (Fr. 33 
(83, LXVl|)--be that one a sage, a council, or the 
citizenry at large speaking the truth in unison. These 
laws establish an invisible harmony providing a propi-
tious way of life and keeping the conflicts and tran-
sactions of all within commonly accepted bounds. The 
city, then, is a place of intelligible structure ex-
pressible as law, nomos, just as the entire world of 
appearances is held in harmony expressible as a lpcjps. 
The kosmos, the bounded harmony of the city, reflects 
the larger kosmos of physis itself. Heraclitus writes, 
"Men should speak with rational awareness and thereby 
hold on strongly to that which is shared in common—as 
a city holds on to its laws, and even more so. For all 
human laws are nourished by the one divine law, which 
prevails as far as it wishes, suffices for all things, 
and yet is something more than they" (Fr. 114 |81, 
XXX | ). As physis stands as the source of the kosmos 
intelligible to humans through their logos, so the 
citizens stand as a source of order for the city orga-
nized according to the laws the citizens articulate in 
common. That is, the citizenry as a source of intelli-
gent order within the city form a microcosm of physis 
and the kosmos itself. 
Although the city and the fame of the citizens is 
no more permanent that anything else, Heraclitus offers 
a view of humans which gives them a truly cosmic signi-
ficance: initiators of harmony in the world of human 
affairs. Professor Werner Jaeger succinctly describes 
this view of humankind: 
For Heraclitus, man is part of the cosmos, and as 
such he is subject to the laws of the cosmos in 
the same way as all its other parts. But since, 
by virtue of his own intellect, he harbours with-
in himself the eternal law of the life of the 
universe, he can share the highest wisdom, from 
whose counsel springs the divine law. The 
freedom of the Greek lies in the fact that he 
subordinates himself, as one part, to the whole 
which is the city-state, and to its law.1* 
Heraclitus has attempted to face unblinking the 
ceaseless strife, the unabating change which confronts 
us, while yet recognizing the underlying unity of all 
that changes through the activity of harmonizing 
physis. Without turning away from the world of appear-
ance, he has tried to show an intelligent power at work 
throughout all things, holding them back from falling 
into chaos, which is itself invisible although recog-
nizable in its efforts. Heraclitus's language, so rich 
in metaphors, has made the sensible world an instrument 
enabling him to instigate reflection upon the non-
sensible powers effective upon sensible experience. 
Obscure, paradoxical to be sure, Heraclitus's words ex-
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press a comprehension of the world as thoroughgoing 
change in a coherent unity, a world, moreover, in which 
there is a significant and honorable place for humans 
as themselves a source of intelligibility in the world 
of human affairs. 
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